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BECAUSE SEX CRIMES ARE DIFFERENT:

WHY MARYLAND SHOULD (CAREFULLY) ADOPT THE
CONTESTED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413 AND 414
THAT PERMIT PROPENSI1Y EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT'S OTHER SEX OFFENSES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1982, a fIfteen-year-old boy named Matthew Curtis arrived at Saint james School,1 an Episcopal boarding school near Hagerstown, Maryland. 2 A self-described "farm kid" who felt adrift
among the more privileged students of St. james, Curtis sought solace
in the church. 3 He soon encountered Father Kenneth Behrel, the
school's thirty-year-old chaplain, who paid special attention to Curtis,
eventually promoting him to sacristan,4 an acolyte's highest station.
According to Curtis, after a gradual progression of late night television watching, foot rubbing, wine drinking, and marijuana smoking,
he and Father Behrel began having oral and anal sex. 5 The sexual
activity, said Curtis, was not coerced,6 and continued for about two
years. 7 This sexual activity often incorporated pornographic materials
that Behrel kept in a footlocker in the living room of his on-campus
apartment. 8
As an adult, Curtis found himself struggling with shame and anger
over his relationship with Behrel, suffering from health and psychological problems, and unable to do anything with his life. 9 He eventually pressed charges against Behrel in 1998. 10
At trial in Washington County, Maryland, Behrel denied having any
sexual contact with CurtisY Behrel further testifIed that Curtis had
continued an amicable relationship with him after they both left St.
james, and also produced several parishioners to vouch for his good
character. 12
1. Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 103,823 A.2d 696,718 (2003), ecrt. denied,
376 Md. 546 (2003).
2. Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 75, 823 A.2d at 702.
3. See id. at 104-05, 823 A.2d at 719.
4. See id. at 103, 823 A.2d at 719.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 105, 823 A.2d at 720.
7. See id. at 104, 823 A.2d at 719.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 106-08, 823 A.2d at 720-21.
10. Id. at 105, 823 A.2d at 719.
11. Id. at 113, 823 A.2d at 724.
12. Id. at 113-14, 823 A.2d at 724.
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To bolster Curtis' credibility, the prosecution entered into evidence
an affidavit containing the testimony of Jeffrey Miller, a former St.
James student. 13 Miller stated that Behrel had also promoted him to
sacristan, and had initiated a sexual relationship that progressed from
foot rubs and wine to oral and anal sex that incorporated the pornographic materials in Behrel's footlocker. 14 The trial judge admitted
the affidavit on the ground that it described Behrel's handiwork, or
his distinctive pattern of grooming his young acolytes for sexual
abuse, and thus had special relevance. 15
The jury found Behrel guilty,16 but the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland vacated the conviction in May, 2003, and remanded the
case. 17 The court held that Miller's testimony was inadmissible under
Maryland's "propensity evidence" rule, which presumptively bans any
evidence of prior offenses used to demonstrate a defendant's propensity to commit a certain type of crime. IS Though this blanket rule,
codified in Maryland Rule 5-404(b), has a remarkable number of exceptions,l9 Miller's testimony-despite its high credibility and overwhelming similarity to Curtis' allegations-did not neatly fit into any
of them. 20
The Behrel reversal is no anomaly. It illustrates the fact that, sound
as Maryland's antiquated "propensity rule" might be in other contexts,
it fails to provide justice for the victims in many sex offense cases. 21
Unlike victims of, say, carjacking or assault, many sex crime victims
are, like Matthew Curtis, steeped in shame and particularly reluctant
to come forward publicly.22 This secrecy ensures that most sex crimes
yield no witnesses and little physical evidence. 23 This is especially true
in child sex abuse cases, which often distill down to a credibility contest between an adult abuser and a frightened, easily discredited
child. 24 Furthermore, the ban on propensity evidence is especially
strict in Maryland, where Rule 5-404(b) is construed more narrowly,
13. See id. at 78, 823 A.2d at 704.
14. See id. at 80-81, 823 A.2d at 705. In a subsequent and separate trial, another
Washington County jury convicted Behrel of sexually abusing Miller. Id. at
75, 823 A.2d at 702. Curtis testified briefly at Miller's trial, but not about
his own alleged sexual relationship with Behrel. Id. at 139, 823 A.2d at 739.
'
15. See id. at 121-22, 823 A.2d at 729.
16. Id. at 75, 823 A.2d at 702. The jury's task was facilitated by evidence that
police had seized a footlocker at Behrel's apartment years later that was full
of pornographic material, sexual aids and nude photographs. See id. at 7881, 823 A.2d at 704-05.
17. Id. at 76, 823 A.2d at 702.
18. See id. at 130-32, 823 A.2d at 734-35.
19. See infra note 36.
20. See Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 131-32, 823 A.2d 696, 735 (2003).
21. See infra Part II.B (discussing other Maryland sex crime cases applying Rule
5-404 (b) ).
22. See infra Part lILA.
23. See infra Part lILA.
24. See infra Part lILA.
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and - perhaps less consistently, than its counterpart mother
jurisdictions. 25
Recognizing this obstacle to achieving justice in child sex abuse
cases, Maryland Delegate Pauline Menes of Prince George's County
and Maryland Senator Jennie Forehand of Montgomery County sponsored a bill in January 2004 that would facilitate admissibility of other
sex offenses as propensity evidence in trials of child molesters. 26 The
proposed statute, which effectively creates a "propensity evidence" exception in Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-404 (b), is modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 414,27 but provides additional safeguards for
defendants. 28
Although two Maryland General Assembly committees shelved the
proposed bill in the 2004 legislative session,29 this comment will explain why the Maryland General Assembly should not only amend the
propensity rule for child sex abuse cases, but also ultimately adopt a
modified version of the federal adult sex crime rule as well. 30 The
discussion will begin with an explanation of the long-standing ban in
Anglo-American law against propensity evidence and how that rule is
applied in Maryland. 31 Next, it will present an overview of Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415,32 in addition to the statutes of
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. For the General Assembly's 218th session in 2004, the bill numbers were
H.B. 401 and S.B. 718. See infra note 29. One of the original proponents of
the bill is Dr. Robert Wack, director of the Carroll County Pediatric Sexual
Assault Forensic Examination Clinic (SAFE), whose experience testifying
on behalf of sexually abused children convinced him that the rule barring
evidence of a sex abuser's past victims disserviced young victims. (Notes on
file with author.)
27. See infra note 98 for text of FED. R. EVID. 414. Note that Maryland legislators did not propose to adopt the two companion rules, 413 and 415, which
allow propensity evidence in sex offense crimes against adults, and in civil
sexual harassment trials, respectively. See infra notes 97, 99.
28. See H.D. 401, 2004 Leg., 218th Sess. (Md. 2004), available at http://mlis.
state.md.us/2004rs/bills/hb/hb040lf.rtf; see also S. 718, 2004 Leg., 218th
Sess. (Md. 2004), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2004rs/bills/sb/
sb0718f.rtf (providing safeguards that include advance notice to the defendant of the evidence's proposed use at trial, a closed hearing on the evidence's admissibility, and judicial discretion as to the circumstances of
admissibility) .
29. The Maryland House Judiciary Committee rejected House Bill 401 on
March 27, 2004. Maryland Assembly Bill Status and Information, H.D. 401,
2004 Leg., 218th Sess. at http://mlis.state.md.us/2004rs/billfile/hb0401.
htm (last modified Aug. 10, 2004). On April 15, 2004 the Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee gave an unfavorable report to Senate Bill 718. Maryland Assembly Bill Status and Information, S. 718, 2004 Leg., 218th Sess.,
at http://mlis.state.md.us/2004rs/billfile/sb0718.htm (last modified Aug.
10, 2004).
30. Admissibility of sex crime evidence in civil cases is outside the scope of this
comment.
31. See discussion infra Parts III.A,B.
32. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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the ten states that have adopted some version of these rules. 33 The
comment will then discuss the four most compelling reasons for
adopting the amended rules in sex crimes cases,34 followed by a discussion, based on how other jurisdictions have implemented these
rules, of how the five main fears of opponents are unjustified. 35

II.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINES

A.

Maryland's Ban on Propensity Evidence Is Remarkably Elastic

Maryland's common law ban on propensity evidence is codified in
Maryland Rule 5-404 (b) , which provides in relevant part that
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith."36 In other words, evidence admitted only to prove a defendant's bad character, or propensity to commit certain types of crime,
is inadmissible. Like its counterparts in other jurisdictions and Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), upon which it is modeled, Maryland's
rule has evolved from the long-standing Anglo-American principle
that information about a defendant's other crimes would so repel or
confuse jury members that they would ignore the merits of the case at
bar and unfairly punish the defendant for his evil nature. 37 The fear
is that, for example, ajury might decide that a man accused of catjacking is probably guilty since he was convicted of robbing a pawn shop
three years ago.
See discussion infra Part II.D.
See discussion infra Part lILA-D.
See discussion infra Part III.E.
MD. R. EVID. 5-404(b). The rule continues: "It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident." [d.
37. See, e.g., Lynn McLain, "Other Acts" Evidence: Recent Decisions lry the Court of
Appeals Undermine the Efficacy of Maryland Rule 5-404(b), 31 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 67 (2000) (describing history of propensity rule); United States v. Enjady,
134 F.3d 1427, 1430 (10th Cir. 1998), explaining:
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though
such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a
probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge
one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to
defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the
practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430 (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,
475-76 (1948».

33.
34.
35.
36.
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Despite the strong language of this principle and its indignant defenders,38 the propensity rule is nonetheless riddled with a remarkable number of exceptions. 39 Recognizing that some evidence is
simply too relevant and probative to keep out,40 Maryland's propensity rule allows evidence of other crimes to be admitted if it is "substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case."41 The second
sentence of Maryland Rule 5-404(b) codifies eight possible exceptions: proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common
scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 42 These exceptions are also widely used in federal and other
jurisdictions under which the evidence may be deemed "substantially
relevant," and thus admissible. 43 In addition to these enumerated exceptions, Maryland courts have created several additional common
law exceptions for "substantial relevance."44 The propensity rule, in
short, is eminently elastic. 45
Furthermore, as its broad title suggests, the rule on "other crimes,
wrongs, or acts"46 encompasses a wide range of misconduct. 47 In Maryland, as elsewhere, this includes not only convictions/8 but other
"bad" acts that are not necessarily crimes,49 as well as uncharged of38. A defender of the existing propensity evidence rule stated that "[ the proposed bill] is trying to turn over 300 years of jurisprudence." Del. Menes'
Proposal: Hearing on H.D. 401 Before the Md. House Judiciary Comm.,
2004 Leg., 218th Sess. (2004) (quoting statement of a Baltimore City criminal defense attorney).
39. See Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144, 160-61, 788 A.2d 662, 671-72 (2002)
(detailing Maryland's exceptions to Rule 5-404(b) and noting that the categories often overlap).
40. See McLain, supra note 37, at &-7.
41. Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 124,823 A.2d 696,731; Harris v. State, 324
Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991).
42. MD. R. EVID. 5-404(b).
43. See FED. R. EVlD. 404(b); see also Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669-70, 350 A.2d
680,684 (1976).
44. Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 124-25, 823 A.2d at 731.
45. See id. at 125, 823 A.2d at 731; see also McLain, supra note 37, at 7.
46. MD. R. EVID. 5-404(b).
47. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (stating that
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) applies in both civil and criminal cases and generally
pertains to any extrinsic act that might adversely reflect on the actor's character); United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 1978)
(stating that FED. R. EVID. 404(b) is not limited only to evidence of other
crimes, but rather its broad language includes "any conduct of the defendant which may bear adversely on the jury's judgment of his character").
48. See, e.g., Whitehead v. State, 54 Md. App. 428, 436, 458 A.2d 905, 909-10
(1983) (allowing admission of defendant's prior convictions for purposes
of impeaching defendant).
49. See, e.g., Synder v. State, 361 Md. 580,585,762 A.2d 125, 128 (2000) (noting
that evidence showing defendant and murder victim had stormy relationship is admissible to show motive under MD. R. EVlD. 5-404 (b) ); Duckworth
v. State, 323 Md. App. 532, 544, 594 A.2d 109, 114 (1991) (upholding,
under the absence of mistake exception in Rule 5-404 (b), the admission of
evidence that defendant, who was on trial for accidentally shooting a three
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fenses 50 and acquittals. 51 It also includes convictions that happened
prior to, concurrent with,52 or after53 the charges in the defendant's
current trial.
Such evidence is not automatically admitted, hqwever. A three-step
approach, first articulated in 1989 in State v. Faulkner,54 governs the
admissibility of other crimes evidence. First, the trial court must determine if the evidence fits within one or more of the pre-existing
exceptions to the rule. If so, the trial court must determine whether
the accused's involvement in the other crimes is established by clear
and convincing evidence. 55 Finally, the trial court must use its discretion to balance the probative value of the other crimes evidence
against any unfair prejudice likely to result from its admission. 56 This
last test has been codified into Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-403,
which provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."57

50.

51.
52.

53.

54.
55.

56.

57.

year old with a BB gun, of an earlier incident in which the defendant had
also accidentally shot the victim with a BB gun).
See, e.g., State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 642-43, 552 A.2d 896, 902 (1989)
(upholding the admission of evidence of three prior uncharged burglaries
in defendant's burglary trial under the modus operandi exception); see also
Anaweck v. State, 63 Md. App. 239, 257, 492 A.2d 658,667-68 (1985), rev'd
on other grounds, Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998) (upholding admission in drug trial of evidence about defendant's prior uncharged
drug sales).
See Wise v. State, 47 Md. App. 656, 669-70, 425 A.2d 652, 660 (1981) (stating
that evidence of an act that resulted in an acquittal is admissible under
"other crimes" law, but is subject to judicial scrutiny).
See, e.g., Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144, 157, 788 A.2d 662, 669 (2002)
(holding that evidence of rapes of three other victims within a nine-day
period, each of which had separate but roughly concurrent trials, were all
admissible in the rape trial of a fourth victim since the crimes were similar
enough to fit under the modus operandi exception to Rule 5-404 (b) ).
See, e.g., United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and stating that "subsequent conduct may be
highly probative of prior intent").
314 Md. at 634-35, 552 A.2d at 898.
See id. This standard is much higher than its federal counterpart, FED. R.
EVlD. 404(b), which requires only that the other crimes evidence be admitted "if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the
defendant committed the similar act." Huddleston v. United States, 485
U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (rejecting a preponderance of the evidence standard
for evidence admitted under FED. R. EVlD. 404(b) exceptions).
Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634-35,552 A.2d at 898; see also Behre1 v. State, 151 Md.
App. 64, 124-25,823 A.2d 696, 730-31 (2003) (citing an updated version of
the three-step test in which MD. R. EVID. 5-403 replaces the common law
probative value balancing test in the third prong of the Faulkner test).
MD. R. EVlD. 5-403.
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Yet, Despite the Numerous Exceptions, Much Sex Crimes Evidence Still
Does Not Fit Through Maryland s Propensity Rule

Although all the exceptions fuel the popular perception that, as
one Maryland trial judge stated, "you can drive a Mack truck through
5-404(b) ,"58 the high courts of Maryland seem to feel otherwise. 59 Indeed, in 1991 the Court of Appeals of Maryland emphasized that Rule
5-404(b) should be one of exclusion-not inclusion-and its exceptions applied only after much scrutiny.60 Furthermore, Chief Justice
Joseph Murphy of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland acknowledged that Maryland's rule on propensity evidence "is more pro-defense than the rules in many jurisdictions, including the federal
rules."61
Given the rule's somewhat schizophrenic elastic-but-exclusive nature, it is not surprising that it continues to be murkily interpreted
and inconsistently applied. 62 This is especially true in sex crimes
cases, where Maryland's rule is so narrowly drawn it excludes an enormous amount of sex crimes evidence-even more so than in other
jurisdictions with a similar rule. 63 The unfortunate result, as Dr.
Wack64 and other sex crime victim advocates testified in Annapolis in
February and March, 2004, is that many of Maryland's repeat sex offenders escape conviction, in part because highly relevant and probative evidence of their other crimes simply does not appear before the
jury.65

1.

Maryland's Exception for Sex Crime Evidence Is Unusually
Narrow

The first distinguishing feature of Maryland's 5-404(b) application
is the unusual narrowness of its sex crime exception. 66 Formally
58. Telephone Interview with the Honorable James J. Lombardi, Associate
Judge, Prince George's County Circuit Court, 7th Judicial Circuit, Md. (Jan.
10, 2004) (notes on file with author).
59. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 494-95, 597 A.2d 956, 959 (1991).
60. See id. "We have re-examined the principles governing admissibility of evidence of other bad acts and have considered the current legal literature
discussing the "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" approaches to the problem .... [W]e conclude that continued adherence to the "exclusionary"
approach is appropriate." Id.
61. Honorable Joseph Murphy, Comments to his Evidence class at the University of Baltimore School of Law (Mar. 31, 2004) (notes on file with author).
62. See, e.g., McLain, supra note 37.
63. See discussion infra Part II.D for sex crime exceptions in other states.
64. See supra note 26.
65. In addition to Dr. Wack, veteran Maryland child protection advocate Ellen
Mugmon and Lisae C. Jordan, legislative counsel for the Maryland Coalition Against Sexual Assault, were among those who testified during the
2004 legislative session about the evidentiary holes in 5-404(b) that allow
repeat sex offenders to escape punishment. (Notes on file with author.)
66. MD. R. EVlD. 5-404(b); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
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adopted in 1989, the long-standing common law exception admits evidence to show the accused's propensity for illicit sexual relations, but
only of the same type and with the same victim. 67 In Acuna v. State, 68
for example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the admission
of testimony of a four-year-old girl that a neighbor-who the girl's
mother caught about to perform cunnilingus on the child-had performed oral sex on the girl at least ten other times. 69
Had the defendant in Acuna performed similar acts on other neighborhood girls, that evidence would not have been admissible in Maryland. 70 Such was the result in State v. Werner,7I for example, where the
Maryland court of appeals affirmed the court of special appeals' reversal of a conviction of a Baltimore man who was indicted for molesting
all three of his stepdaughters on the ground that the trial court had
wrongly admitted the oldest victim's testimony about the sexual abuse
of her younger sister. 72 The trial court had originally allowed the
girl's testimony about the abuse of her younger sister because it explained what propelled her to finally come forward and expose her
stepfather,73 but the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that witness
rehabilitation was not appropriate in this case,74 and there was no 5404(b) exception under which the girl's testimony was otherwise
admissible. 75
The Werner result would be an aberration elsewhere; most of the
other states that have carved out a common law exception for other
sex crimes allow evidence of a sex offender's other victims, especially
in child molestation cases. 76 In fact, admission of such evidence was,
historically, more the rule than the exception. 77 In the early 1920s
about half the states had "lustful disposition" or "depraved instinct"
exceptions to admit propensity evidence of statutory rape, sodomy, or
child molestation. 78 Common law "lustful disposition" or other sex
67. Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 466, 554 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1989) (stating: "Our
acceptance of the exception is not to be taken as meaning that we adopt a
~ro.ad 'sexu~! propensity' exception to the general rule .... It is strictly
hmned .... ).
68. 332 Md. 65, 629 A.2d 1233 (1993).
69. [d. at 75-76, 629 A.2d at 1238.
70. See id. at 75, 629 A.2d at 1238.
71. 302 Md. 550, 489 A.2d 1119 (1985).
72. [d. at 565, 489 A.2d at 1127.
73. [d. at 554, 489 A.2d at 1121.
74. [d. at 562-63, 489 A.2d at 1125.
75. [d. at 557, 489 A.2d at 1122-23.
76. Kansas, Mississippi and Virginia, like Maryland, are among the few states to
limit their sex crime exceptions to the same victim. See State v. Crossman,
624 P.2d 461, 462 (Kan. 1981); Mitchell v. State, 539 So. 2d 1366, 1372
(Miss. 1989); Moore v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 822; 825 (Va. 1981).
77. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1998).
78. [d. See also Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged
Misconduct },vidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 171-81
(1993).
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crime exceptions remain in at least nine other jurisdictions-Arkansas, Washington, D.C., Georgia, Indiana, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin-whose legislatures have not
otherwise codified the exception. 79
2.

Maryland's Propensity Rule, 5-404(b) Is Inconsistently Applied

The second principal reason that Maryland's propensity rule excludes an enormous amount of sex crimes evidence is that the rule is
confusing, inconsistently applied, and often misunderstood. so "Maryland judges exclude a lot of 5-404(b) evidence in sex offense cases,"
said one former Maryland sex crimes prosecutor, "either because they
don't really understand the rule or because they're afraid of being
overturned on appeal."Sl Given the murkiness of the rule's application, it is not surprising that the trial judge in Behrel admitted that he
did not know under which 5-404(b) exception Mitchell's evidence fit,
stating instead that he was admitting the evidence because "there
79. See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 929 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Ark. 1996) (upholding admissibility in trial of a man accused of raping his nineteen-year-old daughter of
evidence that he had been convicted of raping his six-year-old stepdaughter
years before);Johnson v. United States, 610 A.2d 729,730 (D.C. 1992) (upholding admissibility, in trial against defendant's sex crimes against three
teenaged girls, of evidence of defendant's prior sexual abuse of two other
teenaged girls to show his "unusual sexual preference"); Goins v. State, 571
S.E.2d 195 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming admission offacts underlying a
prior conviction for rape, sodomy and sexual abuse, as relevant to lustful
disposition); Kuchel v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1032, 1033 (Ind. 1986)
("[E]vidence of former similar offenses is admissible in sex crimes involving
a 'depraved sexual instinct' [such as child molestation] whereas it is not per
seadmissible in a rape case .... "); State v. Stephens, 466 N.W.2d 781, 785-86
(Neb. 1991) (upholding trial court's admission, in the trial of a man convicted of raping his one-month old granddaughter, of evidence that he had
also repeatedly molested his stepdaughter from age four to fourteen); State
v. Reeder, 413 S.E.2d 580, 583 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing 'other
crimes' evidence to show defendant's "unnatural lust, intent or state of
mind"); State v. Fears, 688 P.2d 88,90 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing modus
operandi evidence to rebut a defense of consent in sex crimes cases); State v.
Parsons, 589 S.E.2d 226, 234 (W. Va. 2003) ("Collateral acts or crimes may
be introduced in cases involving child sexual assault or sexual abuse victims
to show the perpetrator had a lustful disposition towards the victim, a lustful disposition towards children generally, or a lustful disposition to specific
other children .... "); State v. Fishnick, 378 N.W.2d 272, 277-78 (Wis. 1985)
(upholding admissibility against man convicted of raping three-year-old girl
of evidence that man had, one week prior to incident, molested a thirteen
year old and exposed himself to a twelve-year-old girl).
80. See generally McLain, supra note 37. See, e.g., infra note 84, discussing how
two Maryland appellate courts differ in defining the modus operandi
exception.
81. Telephone Interview with Adam Rosenberg, former Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Sex Offense Division (July 7, 2004) (notes on file
with author).
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seems to be a niche within the rules that creates an exception for testimony such as this."82
There is no such niche in Maryland law. Although, as in Behrel, the
State may try to admit evidence of an accused's other molestation victims under the "common scheme" exception of 5-404(b), the rule
does not consistently permit it. 83 Maryland appellate courts generally
hold "common scheme" to mean either: (1) modus operandi, or distinctive pattern of doing things that suggests the handiwork or signature
of the accused, which is usually only used when the defendant's identity is in doubt;84 or (2) a plan to commit an offense as part of a grand
scheme to commit others, such as a theft of nitroglycerine for use in
blowing open a safe. 85
Thus, in Maryland, evidence of a defendant's pattern of sexual contact with one child, such as Father Behrel's abuse of Miller, is not
admissible under "common scheme" to prove evidence of very similar
conduct with a different victim, such as Curtis. 86 The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland reached a similar result in McKinney v. State,
where it reversed the conviction of an adult male camp counselor for
sexually touching three prepubescent girls in a three-day period on
the ground that the sex crime evidence did not fit under any 5-404(b)
exceptions-including the "common scheme" exception-and thus
the trials of the three girls had been improperly joined. 87
Similarly, in Reidnauer v. State,88 the court reversed the conviction of
a man for raping two prostitutes on two separate occasions after both
women testified that the defendant had driven them to his place of
employment, penetrated them vaginally and anally with Vaseline, and
82. Behre1 v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 122,823 A.2d 696, 729 (2003).
[The Court found that the evidence] does fit within a niche, and
I'm not sure what it should be called, whether it's identity, opportunity, preparation, identical method earmarking of the handy
work [SlC] of the accused, whatever you may want to call it, there
seems to be a niche within the Rules that creates an exception for
testimony such as this, once again, to allow the State to show the
identical method of the grooming of young men, fifteen years of
age, under the circumstances presented here for the abuses alleged
in this case.
ld.
83. See id. at 128-29, 823 A.2d at 733-34 (discussing "common scheme" rule in
the instant case and others).
84. See Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144, 161-62, 788 A.2d 662, 672 (2002)
(stating that modus operandi evidence is generally only used when the identity of the accused is in doubt, although Maryland courts have not been
consistent on this issue); but see Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 670, 350 A.2d
680, 684 (1976) (listing modus operandi as a propensity rule exception in its
own right, independent of its use to prove identity).
85. McKinney v. State, 82 Md. App. 111, 124,570 A.2d 360, 366 (1990).
86. See Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 130, 823 A.2d at 734.
87. See McKinney, 82 Md. App. at 128, 570 A.2d at 368.
88. 133 Md. App. 311, 755 A.2d 553 (2000).
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told them he had AIDS.89 The court reversed on the ground that the
crimes were not admissible together under the "common scheme" exception, and thus the cases had been improperly joined. 90
Such results, however, seem to lack logic, because the crimes in
those cases seem similar enough that the evidence should, as the trial
judge in Behrel noted, fit under some 5-404(b) exception. 91 Indeed,
courts in other jurisdictions have historically admitted such similar
pattern evidence under the "common scheme" or other 5-404(b) exception, although not always predictably or consistently.92 Such legal
manipulation is still commonplace in those jurisdictions, like Maryland, that have not yet clarified their sex crimes exceptions. 93 Maryland's current law on admission of sex crime evidence resembles the
uneven, ad hoc state of admissibility of sex crimes evidence that was
present among the states and federal courts a decade ago; it excludes
a great deal of highly relevant sex crimes evidence, or results in appellate litigation when the trial courts admit that evidence.

c..

Recognizing the Limits of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to Admit Sex
Crimes Evidence, Congress Enacted Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415

Fueled in part by frustration over similar inconsistencies inherent in
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), U.S. Senator Robert Dole and Representative Susan Molinari proposed rules in 1994 that would allow in
evidence of a serial molester or rapist's prior victims. 94 As Senator
Dole stated: "[W] hen someone is out there committing sex crime after sex crime ... it is this Senator's view that this evidence should be
admitted at trial without a protracted struggle over whether the evi89. Id. at 315-16, 755 A.2d at 555.
90. See id. at 315, 755 A.2d at 555.
91. See Behre~ 151 Md. App. at 122, 823 A.2d at 729.
92. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex
Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 560-61 (1994) (citing decades-old history of legal manipulation to admit "other crimes" evidence in sex offense
cases, and stating that, in general, the unpredictable and ad hoc admission
of sex crime evidence is still a common basis for reversal of trial court
decisions) .
93. See, e.g., Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d 1226, 1233 (Ala. 1988) (emphasizing
that Alabama courts recognize no formal sex crime exception, but also approving the courts' practice of liberalizing admission of prior sexual abuse
evidence under the "other purposes" exceptions of ALA. R. EVlD. 404(b));
State v. Bros., 564 S.E.2d 603, 607 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that North
Carolina's appellate courts are "markedly liberal" in admitting evidence of
similar sex offenses under N.C. R. EVlD. 404(b)); State v. Cramer, Nos.
76663, 76664, 2000 WL 1144975, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2000)
(allowing, in trial of stepfather accused of sexually abusing his stepdaughter, evidence of defendant's prior abuse of his niece under opportunity,
identity, preparation and plan exceptions to OHIO R. EVlD. 404(b)).
94. 140 CONGo REc. H5437-03 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari, who traced a brief history of the proposed rules).
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dence has been properly admitted under Rule 404(b) or some other
exception. "95
July 9, 1995 was the effective date of Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415, which liberalize the admission of evidence of an accused
person's other sexual misconduct or sex offenses. 96 The rules cover a
broad range of cases: Federal Rule of Evidence 413 applies in criminal
cases of sexual assault;97 Rule 414 applies to child sex abuse cases;98
and Rule 415 applies to civil cases. 99
The federal rules, in effect, codify a ninth exception to Rule 404(b)
by allowing evidence of an accused's other sex offenses to be admitted
to show his propensity to commit that type of crime. 100 Such evidence
is not automatically admitted, however. The rules do not allow such
evidence in dissimilar or unrelated crimes, such as kidnappings or
burglaries. 101 Although not specifically stated in the rules, the courts
must subject Rules 413, 414 and 415 to the probative value verses unfair prejudice balancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 102
The overall goal of the new rules, according to Representative
Molinari, is to protect the public from repeat rapists and child molesters.103 Congress passed the rules in response to the growing public
perception that recidivist child molesters and rapists were going un95. 139 CONGo REc. S15,137-38 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1993).
96. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 320935(d), 108 Stat. 1796.
97. FED. R. EvlO. 413(a). Rule 413 reads in relevant part: "In a criminal case in
which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of
the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault
is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which
it is relevant." Id.
98. FED. R. EVlO. 414(a). Rule 414 reads in relevant part: "In a criminal case in
which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence
of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant." [d.
99. FED. R. EvlO. 415(a). Rule 415 reads in relevant part:
In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an
offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that
party's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault
or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
[d.
100. See United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1329 (lOth Cir. 1998) (stating
that Federal Rule 413 supersedes Rule 404(b)'s general restriction on propensity evidence, and allows the government to offer evidence of defendant's prior sexual misconduct for the purpose of demonstrating his
propensity to commit the charged offense).
101. LYNN MCLAIN, 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE: MARYLAND EVIDENCE, STATE & FEDERAL § 413.2 at 874-76 (2001).
102. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating, "The
legislative history ... indicates that the district court must apply Rule 403
balancing and may exclude such evidence in an appropriate case.").
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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punished because juries do not hear of relevant past offenses. 104 This
perception was formed by several highly-publicized events in the
1990s, such as the rape trials of William Kennedy Smith and boxer
Mike Tyson, and the rape/murder of nine-year-old Megan Kanka by a
repeat sex offender. lo5
The Kennedy Smith case illustrates the utility of Federal Rule 413,
which addresses the past behavior of adult "date rape" defendants,
who are often viewed with more sympathy than their victims. 106
Smith, a nephew of U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy, was acquitted in December, 1991 107 of allegedly tackling and raping a young woman who
had given him a ride back to his family's Palm Beach compound after
meeting at a nearby nightclub. 108 Absent from the jury's deliberations
were the sworn statements of three other women who alleged sexual
attacks by Smith that were similar to that alleged by the Palm Beach
victim. 109 The trial judge excluded this evidence without comment,110
ostensibly because the attacks did not fit under Florida's then-existing
exceptions to the propensity rule, which mirror those currently in ef104. See, e.g., David]. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases
and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. IS, lS-16 (1994) (discussing impetus
for Federal Rules 413-1S); Sherry L. Scott, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules
of Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 3S
Hous. L. REv. 1729, 1731-32 (1999) (discussing impetus for Federal Rules
413-1S).
105. See Jeffrey Waller, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-15: "Laws Are Like Medicine;
They Generally Cure an Evillry a Lesser . .. Evil," 30 TEX. TECH. L. REv. IS03,
IS0S-07 (1999) (summarizing several high-profile sex-offense cases that
predated the adoption of Federal Rules 413-1S).
106. Studies show that-absent corroborating evidence-both female and male
jurors are often unfairly prone to disbelieve adult rape victims. See, e.g.,
Scott, supra note 104, at 1743.
107. Florida v. Smith, No. 91-S482CFA02 (Fla. Palm Beach County Ct. Dec. 11,
1991) at http://oris.co.palm-beach.f1. us/ or_web 1/ details.asp?doc_id=S 7S1
689&file_num.
108. See Mary Jordan, Jury Finds Smith Not Guilty of Rape; Quick Verdict Ends Emcr
tional Legal Battle, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1991, at AI; Mary Jordan, Smith's
Tearful Accuser Tells of Yelling 'Stop!'; Alleged Victim Testifies at Rape Trial,
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1991, at AI. The victim, the stepdaughter of a wealthy
Florida businessman, testified that after she gave Smith a ride home she
accompanied him into the house, where she saw Senator Edward Kennedy
and his son. She then went for an amorous walk along the beach with the
seemingly gentlemanly Smith, who suddenly attacked her, knocked her to
the ground and raped her, saying "no one is going to believe you." Id. Too
distraught to drive after the attack, she called a friend for a ride home. Id.
109. Mary Jordan, 3 Women in Affidavits Accuse Smith of Sex Attacks; Statements Describe Alleged Assaults in Graphic Detail: 'Ferocious . . . Almost Animal-Like,'
WASH. POST,July 23,1991, at AS (all three women described Smith inviting
them to one of the Kennedy's impressive homes under some pretext, then
physically tackling and raping, or trying to rape, them); see also Rick Hampson, Experts Say Judge Had to Exclude Other Women, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec.
13, 1991, at D6.
110. See Hampson, supra note 109, at D6.
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feet in Maryland. l l l Without that additional evidence, the trial became a credibility contest between a well-spoken doctor from a
prominent family and a single mother portrayed by the defense as a
histrionic nut who was angry after a night of love gone bad.112 The
jury quickly decided in favor of Mr. Kennedy Smith. 113

D.

Adoption of the Rules in Other States

Minus the celebrity and media attention, of course, the essential
elements of the Kennedy Smith rape trial are found in every jurisdiction: accuser, accused, possibly forced sex, no witnesses, scant physical
evidence. In response, the legislatures of ten states have, as of June,
2004, adopted their own versions of Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415.11 4 Five of these states-Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, and Illinois-have embraced all three of the rules' provisions,
enacting comprehensive laws that allow in evidence of a defendant's
other sex crimes in child molestation, criminal sexual offense, and
civil sexual offense cases. 115 Five other states-Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, and Texas-have enacted rules (somewhat like those
proposed in the 2004 session of the Maryland General Assembly) that
allow in such evidence only for sexual offenses against minors.116 Including the nine states that have carved out common law exceptions
to their propensity rules for sex crimes,117 a total of 19 states plus all
the federal courts overtly recognize an exception for sex crimes
evidenceY8
111. Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 90.404(2) (a) (1991):
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible
when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or
propensity.
with MD. R. EVlD. 5-404(b).
112. See A Day-try-Day Account of Courtroom Proceedings, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec.
12,1991, at A7;Janet Cawley, Smith Denies Rape, Says Sex 'Completely Mutual,'
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1991, at Cl; Mary Jordan, Smith Defense Calls It an 'Act of
Love'; Rape Trial opens After Key State Evidence Is Ruled Inadmissible, WASH.
POST, Dec. 2, 1991, at AS.
113. Chris Lavin, Smith Acquitted of Rape; Jury Out Just 77 Minutes, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at AI.
114. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
115. ALAsKA R. EVlD. 404(b); ARIz. R. EVID. 404(c); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 131420 (West 2001); CAL. R. EVlD. §§ 1101, 1108; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1610-301 (West 2003); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.3 (West 2002).
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(b)(l) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-4-15(a) (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. CODE EVlD. ANN. art. 412.2
(West 2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. !§ 566.025 (West Supp. 2004); TEX. CRIM.
PRoc. CODE ANN. § 38.37 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
117. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.

2004]
III.

Because Sex Crimes Are Different

117

WHY MARYlAND NEEDS A HEIGHTENED PROPENSI1Y
RULE

Why should Maryland follow the trend towards liberalizing admission of other crimes in sex offense cases? Why should such evidence
be preferentially admitted over, for example, past evidence of drunk
driving charges? The primary reasons, discussed below, are summarized in this portion of the preamble to Colorado's statute:
[S] exual offenses are a matter of grave statewide concern.
These frequently occurring offenses are aggressive and assaultive violations of the well-being, privacy, and security of
the victims ... [and] result in serious and long-lasting harm
to individuals and society. These offenses often are not reported or are reported long after the offense for many reasons ... [and] usually occur under circumstances in which
there are no witnesses except for the accused and the victim,
and, because of this and the frequent delays in reporting,
there is often no evidence except for the conflicting testimony. Moreover, there is frequently a reluctance on the part
of others to believe that the offenses occurred. 119
A.

Nature of Sex Offenses Means There Are Almost Never Witnesses, and,
Due to Delay in Reporting, Often No Physical Evidence

The most compelling argument for liberalizing admission of a defendant's prior sex crimes is that such crimes often take place in secret, leaving no witnesses. Fear and shame prevent victims from
reporting, thus there is often no current physical evidence. 12o Since
the parties often know each other, the sex is "consensual," and may
leave no bruises or scars.121 The result is that, as in the Kennedy
Smith and Behrel trials,122 sex offense cases often result in a credibility contest between two parties, between whom there is usually a great
disparity of power. 123 In urging the adoption of the federal rules,
Representative Molinari characterized many rape trials as "unresolvable swearing matches."124 This characterization is especially true of
many child sex abuse cases. 125
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-301(1) (West 1998).
See Karp, supra note 104, at 20-2l.
See supra notes 7, 14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy Smith
trial); see also Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 130-31,823 A.2d 696,734
(2003) (stating: "The central issue here was whether the abuse occurred at
all, and the strength of the State's case rested largely on the jury's assessment of Curtis's credibility and Behrel's veracity.").
123. See, e.g., 140 CONGo REc. H23,603 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (quoting statement of Rep. Molinari, characterizing many rape trials as "un resolvable
swearing matches").
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 2001-221(1), which provides that:

119.
120.
12l.
122.

118

B.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 34

Damage to Victims, Especially Children, Is Unique

A second compelling reason for Maryland to treat sex crime evidence differently is that rape and incest, although crimes of violence,
have a particularly psychological dimension. 126 Sex crimes confuse
something private and intimate with something criminal, and often
cause shame and stigma for the victim greater than that associated
with any other crime. 127 Furthermore, the effects are often lifelong. 128 These effects of child abuse can be devastating and also quite
costly. For example, at sentencing proceedings in death penalty cases,
one often hears that the defendant was abused as a child. 129 Bringing
perpetrators of child sex abuse to justice can help stop the chain of
abuse and thus serve strong public policy interests. 130

C.

High Number of Victims for Repeat Offenders and Strong Evidence that
Repeat Offenders Will Strike Again

The high number of victims, combined with the probability that
many sex offenders will commit other sex offenses, is the third main
justification for the new rules. Sex offenders are unique: other
criminals usually do not commit sex offenses. 131 In fact, the Department of Justice reported in 2003 that sex offenders are four times

126.
127.
128.

129.

130.
131.

[I]n cases of child sexual abuse, the credibility of the victim is frequently a focal issue of the case, and
... [E]vidence which shows that an accused child molester has
molested children at other times may be relevant to corroborate
the victim's testimony, and
... [E]vidence which shows that an accused child molester has
molested children at other times may have a probative value which
outweighs its prejudicial effect.
David L. Corwin et. aI., Modem History of Child Sexual Abuse Awareness: Cycles
of Discovery and Suppression, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 7, 9, 18 (1993).
ld. at 10.
See, e.g., Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 10M)8, 823 A.2d 696, 720-21
(2003). The court recounted a recorded telephone conversation in which
the adult Curtis confronts Behrel, saying:
You know, I've spent fifteen years believing that it was my fault, and
that I was dirty and nasty . . . . [M]y life has been basically over
since the end of [the abuse]. You know .... I'm thirty-two years
old, and I'm trying to move on with my life, and I can't close this
chapter of my life without speaking with you about it . . . . I want
my power back. You took it all away from me.
ld.
Memorandum in Support of H.D. 401 from Professor Lynn McLain of the
University of Baltimore School of Law, to Maryland Representative Joseph
P. Vallario, Chair of House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 20, 2004) (on file
with author).
See WILLIAM E. PRENDERGAST, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
78-79 (Continuum Publishing 1996); see also Kevin M. Wallis, Perspectives on
Offenders, in FROM VICTIM TO OFFENDER 1, 10-11 (Freda Briggs ed., 1995).
See Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1203,
1208, n.41 (1998).

2004]

Because Sex Crimes Are Different

119

more likely than any other released prisoner to commit a sex crime. 132
Common sense indicates that a strong compulsion to rape strangers
or molest children is not something that disappears on its own, without extensive treatment. As Representative Molinari stated, "a history
of [child molestation in a defendant] tends to be exceptionally probative because it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant-a sexual or sado-sexual interest in children-that simply does not exist in
ordinary people."133 As Chief Judge Richard Posner of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted as dicta in one
case, propensity evidence and motive evidence overlap in sex crime
cases because "[m]ost people do not have a taste for sexually molesting children ... [and] as between two suspected molesters, then,
only one of whom has a history of such molestation, the history establishes a motive that enables the two suspects to be distinguished."134
The principle is simple: several prior instances of violent behavior are
often an important indicator of future violent tendencies. 135
It should be noted, however, that no conclusive data proves that
most sex offenders are exceptional recidivists, i.e. that they are more
likely to commit another sex offense than a murderer is to commit
another murder. 136 Because sex crimes are vastly underreported,137
and sex crime recidivism samples vary widely,138 recidivism rates range
from an improbably low 2.5% for rapists to as high as 77% for a subgroup of core pedophiles. 139 Most studies place the baseline range
from about 20% to 45% for both rapists and child molesters. 14o
132. PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 12 (2003), available at http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
133. See 140 CONGo REc. H23,603 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994).
134. United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1996).
135. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997) (upholding the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act and stating that "previous instances of
violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent tendencies.").
136. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
137. CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF
SEX OFFENDERS 3 (2001), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.pdf.
138. Id. at 2 (noting that sex offender subgroups, definition of recidivism, and
length of study all yield very different results).
139. See supra note 132, at 8 (showing that 2.5% of released rapists out of
272,111 former inmates from fifteen states, including Maryland, were arrested for another rape within three months of release), available at http:! /
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/rpr94.pdf; see also Eric S. janus & Paul E.
Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Of
fender Commitment Proceeding, 3 PSVCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 33, 54, 57, nn. 125,
134 (1997) (citing R. KARL HANSON ET AL, OTTAWA: CORRECTIONS BRANCH,
MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, LONG-TERM FOLLOW-UP OF
CHILD MOLESTERS: RISK PREDICTORS AND TREATMENT OUTCOME 22 (1992)
(noting a 77% recidivism rate among a subgroup of incarcerated child
molesters) .
140. See janus, supra note 139, at 51.
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Nonetheless, the fact that "all fifty states, the District of Columbia,
and the federal government have adopted some form of sex offender
registration or community notification programs"141 is further evidence that a link between sex offenders and recidivism is widely recognized. Finally, even more compelling is the fact that studies
consistently show that many convicted child molesters each have committed numerous, even hundreds, of sex offenses that are never reported or punished. 142
D.

The Federal Rules Are Consistent with the Trend of Focusing on the Actions of Sex Crime Defendants, Not the Alleged Consent of Sex Crime
Victims

The 1995 federal rules continue the evidentiary trend of focusing
on the perpetrators, rather than the victims, of sexual violence. 143
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that
this trend is reflected in the state and federal rape shield statutes,144
which, like Federal Rule of Evidence 413, encourage "rape reporting
and increased conviction rates by directing the jury's attention to the
defendant."145
Federal Rule of Evidence 413 also "limits the prejudice to the victim
that often results from jurors' tendencies to blame victims" in sex offense cases. 146 Even victims in sex crimes involving children are
placed under far more scrutiny than defendants because, among
other things, "there is a general notion that kids lie to get out of being
punished, and also the fact that people simply don't want to believe
these things happen."147

E.

Why the Worst Fears of Critics Are Unfounded: Congressional and State
Responses

Despite these arguments, many believe that the federal rules and its
spin-offs are ill-conceived and dangerous to defendants' civil liberties. 148 Yet these fears are largely unfounded for several reasons: 1)
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Young v. State, 370 Md. 686, 692 n.3, 806 A.2d 233, 236 n.3 (2002).
See Scott, supra note 104, at 1740; see also LANGAN, supra note 132, at 1-2.
See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432 (lOth Cir. 1998).
Rape shield statutes generally prohibit a sexual assault victim's prior sexual
history from being a subject of inquiry in a trial against the accused. See,
e.g, FED. R. EVlD. 412.
Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1432.
[d.
Telephone Interview with Adam Rosenberg, former Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Sex Offense Division (July 7, 2004) (notes on file
with author).
Scott, supra note 104, at 1735; Waller, supra note 105, at 1521-23. Even
several co-sponsors of Maryland's proposed House Bill attacked those who
had come to testifY on the bill's behalf at a House Judiciary Committee
Hearing on February 19, 2004. Personal observation of the hearing on
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the rules are not as new as they sound l49 : some evidence that critics so
fear, such as allegations of uncharged prior sex offenses, is already
allowed in under current Maryland law,150 albeit inconsistently; 2) the
rules contain time-tested procedural safeguards that successfully balance the rights of the accused with those of the accuser;151 and 3)
some of the fears rest on nothing more than deep anxiety about sex in
general, and an unwarranted fear of false rape allegations in
particular. 152

1.

The Federal Rules Are Constitutional

The main criticism against the rules is that, by creating an exception to the propensity rule, they violate the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which guarantees defendants a fair trial. 153 Critics
charge that the jury will be so prejudiced by the other offenses-especially in the case of a child molester-that they will convict based on
their outrage, not on the facts related to the current charge, thus violating the defendant's right to a fair trial. 154 The constitutionality of
the federal rules, however, has been upheld. The first court to do so
was the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Enjady.155 In Enjady, a rape defendant, who resided on a Native American reservation, appealed his conviction on the ground that
Federal Rule of Evidence 413 violated the Fifth Amendment by allowing the trial court to admit testimony of another woman who said
he had raped her two years earlier. 156
The court upheld the constitutionality of the rules for five reasons.
First, although the ban on propensity evidence is a long-standing principle, it is not embedded in the Constitution. 157 Second, Rules 413415 allow other victims to corroborate the complainant's account,
which is important in crimes that often leave no witnesses. 158 As the
court stated, "[b] roader admissibility of prior rapes places before the
jury evidence that the defendant 'lacks [the] moral inhibitions that
would prevent him from committing rapes' and implies that the

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

158.

H.D. 401 before the House Judiciary Committee during the 418th session
of the 2004 General Assembly. (Notes on file with author.)
See Karp, supra note 104, at 23.
See Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 125-26,823 A.2d 696, 730-31 (2003);
see also Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144, 163-64, 788 A.2d 662, 673 (2002).
See Scott, supra note 104, at 1736-38.
See infra Part III.E.5.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Karp, supra note 104, at 222; see also Scott, supra note 104, at 1738-39.
134 F.3d 1427.
Id. at 1429.
Id. at 1432 ("Many procedural practices-including evidentiary rules-that
have long existed have been changed without being held unconstitutional.
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and subsequent amendments are examples.").
Id.
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threat of criminal sanctions has not deterred the defendant in the
past."159 Third, "[c]orroboratory information about the defendant
also limits the prejudice to the victim that often results from jurors'
tendencies to blame victims in acquaintance rape cases."160 Fourth,
"like rape shield statutes codified in the federal and state rules of evidence, Rule 413 encourages rape reporting and increased conviction
rates by directing the jury's attention to the defendant."161 Fifth, the
requirement that courts apply a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test provides adequate due process for the defendant. 162
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of Federal Rule of Evidence 414 in United States v.
Castillo. 163 In admitting several uncharged allegations of a father's
sexual abuse of his two daughters, the Castillo court echoed the reasons from the Enjady court, and also added two more. 164 One, that
the common law "lustful disposition" exception historically applied in
so many states favors the idea that Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415
stand on firm notions of fairness in trial. 165 Two, the rules are also
subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 402, which requires relevancy.166
The Castillo court also rejected the defendant's somewhat far-fetched
arguments that the rules violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendmene 67 and the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 168
The Castillo court also addressed the commonly stated concern that,
as one Maryland defense attorney complained to the Maryland General Assembly, once juries hear about a defendant's prior sex offenses,
the trial is a "slam dunk" win for the prosecution. 169 For this argument to hold true, stated the Castillo court, 'Juries would have to ignore courts' instructions to them that they consider only the crime
charged in deciding whether to convict."170 The court noted: "A central assumption of our jurisprudence is that juries follow the instruc159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1432-33.
163. 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998).
164. Id. at 881-82.
165. Id. at 881.
166. Id. at 882.
167. Id. at 883 (stating that the rational basis test was met by the government's
"need for corroborating evidence in cases of sexual abuse of a child because of the highly secretive nature of these sex crimes and because often
the only available proof is the child's testimony").
168. Id. at 884.
169. Personal observation of the hearing on H.D. 401 before the House Judiciary Committee during the 418th session of the 2004 General Assembly.
(Notes on file with author.)
170. Castillo, 140 F.3d at 884. The court noted, "The rule does not impose criminal punishment at all; it is merely an evidentiary rule." Id.
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tions they receive."171 A former Maryland sex crimes prosecutor
echoes the sentiment that juries generally heed such instructions:
"[I]fyou get prior acts in, defense counsel has a great argument lined
up that you can't convict based onjust these prior bad acts, which may
make it harder for a jury to convict because, in my experience, they
may overcompensate and not want to convict based on that."172
2.

Admitting Uncharged Offenses Does Not Unfairly Prejudice the
Defendant Because, Not Only Are Uncharged Offenses Routinely
Admitted Now, but the Sex Crime Rules Contain Special Procedural Safeguards Absent Elsewhere

Some critics are alarmed that Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415
and their state counterparts allow admission of evidence of uncharged
offenses. 173 There are at least five reasons why there is no need for
alarm. First, evidence of uncharged offenses is already allowed in
under Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-404(b) .174 There is nothing new
about this.
Second, in Maryland, evidence of uncharged allegations must meet
a stringent clear and convincing evidentiary standard. I75 This is
stricter than the federal rules. I76 Maryland's evidentiary standard was
met in Acuna v. State, for example, where the court held that a fouryear-old girl's descriptions of prior acts of oral sex by her stepfather
were admissible since the detail provided by the girl was specific
enough and so inappropriate for her age that it met the clear and
convincing standard of proof of admissibility.In
On the other hand, the standard also keeps out unsound allegations. Florida Statute 90.404(2) (b) (1),178 which codifies that state's
version of Federal Rule of Evidence 414 but, unlike the federal rule,
171. Id.
172. E-mail from Adam Rosenberg, former Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Sex Offense Division, to the author (July 7, 2004) (on file with
author).
173. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Pickett, The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The New
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in
Washington, 70 WASH. L. REv. 883, 884, 899 (1995).
174. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing uncharged offenses, bad acts, acquittals and other non-<:onvictions currently admissible
under Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-404 (b) ); see also MD. R. EVlD. 5-404 (b).
175. Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 72, 629 A.2d 1233, 1236 (1993); Vogel v. State,
315 Md. 458,467',554 A.2d 1231, 1235 (1989).
176. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the Huddleston
standard) .
177. Acuna, 332 Md. at 76, 629 A.2d at 1238.
178. FlA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2) (b) (1) (West Supp. 2004) provides: "In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."
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imposes a clear and convincing standard on uncharged allegations, 179
provides a good example for Maryland. The standard was not met in
a case involving a 41-year-old man accused of statutory rape of a 13year-old girl. ISO The trial judge ruled inadmissible testimony that defendant had fondled a 13-year-old girl who was staying at his house
eight years previously, because the authorities had not found enough
evidence to charge the defendant when the girls reported the incident eight years ago. 1S1
Third, judicial gloss on the federal rules requires that uncharged
offenses must be similar to the crime charged. 1s2 For example, in
United States v. LeCompte,lS3 the court allowed evidence showing the
defendant's abuse of his first wife's young niece closely resembled his
pattern of game playing, exposure, and touching with his second
wife's young niece. 1s4 The case law in most jurisdictions does not support the fear that an unrelated sexual allegation, such as the attempted rape of an adult woman, will be allowed into the trial of a
defendant charged with fondling a young boy.1s5
Fourth, uncharged offenses in Maryland (and under the federal
rules) must still pass the balancing test for probative value verses unfair prejudice of Rule 5_403. 1S6 In applying its federal counterpart,
Rule 403, the federal courts consider the following factors in sexual
assault cases:
1) [H] ow clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how probative the evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to
prove; 3) how seriously disputed the material fact is; and 4)
whether the government can avail itself of any less prejudicial evidence. When analyzing the probative dangers, a
court considers: 1) how likely is it such evidence will contril>179. Audano v. State, 641 So. 2d 1356, 1358-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
180. [d.
181. [d. (stating that" [w]e agree that the collateral accusations were not established by clear and convincing evidence. The stories were inconsistent ....
Although a conviction is not a prerequisite for admission of evidence of
other crimes, no offense was charged. The authorities did not believe the
girls' stories at the time.") (citations omitted).
182. United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Meachem, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1997).
183. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
184. LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 768.
185. Georgia is one of the only states that liberally (perhaps too liberally) allows
evidence of unrelated sexual allegations into child molestation cases. See,
e.g., Davis v. State, 517 S.E.2d 808, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (evidence of
prior inappropriate conversations held relevant to lustful disposition); Barrett v. State, 559 S.E.2d 108, 110 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (prior requests for
anal sex with wife held relevant in prosecution involving anal sex with a
minor, despite differences between the acts, including age of other party
and presence or absence of consent).
186. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998); see also
State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 635, 552 A.2d 896,898 (1989).
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ute to an improperly-based jury verdict; 2) the extent to
which such evidence will distract the jury from the central
issues of the trial; and 3) how time consuming it will be to
prove the prior conduct. 187
Clearly, not all uncharged allegations make it through these procedural hurdles. 188 When Maryland courts apply Rule 5-403, case law
requires them to perform the Rule 5-403 analysis on the record explaining the reasoning underlying admission or exclusion of the uncharged offense. 189 This ensures that the Rule 5-403 analysis is
deliberate and allows the appellate court to determine whether the
rule has been properly applied. 190
Finally, Federal Rules 413-415 require prosecutors to give fIfteen
days advance notice to defendants regarding specillc evidence of
other sex offenses prosecutors will submit, giving defendants time to
prepare a full rebuttal. 191 This notice requirement does not exist
under Maryland Rule 5-404(b) .192 Therefore, the federal rules provide greater procedural protection to the defendant than if the defendant was charged with an offense that was not of a sexual nature. 193
3.

Remote Claims Are Not Necessarily Unfair to the Defendant, and
the Judge May Use Discretion in Admitting Such Claims

Critics of the proposed sex crime exception are also alarmed that
evidence of very old convictions or allegations may be allowed into a
sex offender's trial, since the new rules have no time limit. 194 Again,
however, there is nothing new about admitting remote claims; Maryland courts have done so for decades. 195 Since there is no statute of
limitations on murder cases or child sex abuse cases, Maryland rules
of evidence have long allowed in rape or murder claims dating back
decades, as long as they are relevant for other purposes. l96 In
187. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (10th Cir. 1998)
(excluding testimony of other patients who alleged the doctor had inappropriately touched them, under Rule 413 in the doctor's sexual harassment
trial because the testimony was deemed overly prejudicial under Rule 403).
189. Streater v. State, 352 Md. 800, 810, 724 A.2d Ill, 116 (1999).
190. See id.
191. FED. R. EVID. 413(b), 414(b), 415(b); Karp, supra note 104, at 18.
192. See MD. R. EVlD. 5-404(b).
193. See Karp, supra note 104, at 24-25.
194. See, e.g., 140 CONGo REc. S10,277 (daily ed. Aug. 2,1994) (statement of Sen.
Biden expressing concern that allowing "unsubstantiated testimony about
something that could have happened-anything-from the day before to
50 yea~~ before into a trial ... absolutely violates every basic tenet of our
system. ).
195. See McLain, supra note 101, § 404.5, at 645-46.
196. See, e.g., State V. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 642-43, 552 A.2d 896, 902 (1989)
(finding "other crimes" evidence of two robberies that were three and four
years old was probative and admissible on the limited issue of identity);
Hoes V. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 63-65, 368 A.2d 1080, 1082-83 (1977) (evi-
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Merzbacher v. State,197 testimony from several adults who had allegedly
been terrorized and sexually assaulted by a sadistic high school
teacher twenty years prior was admitted to help explain why the adult
prosecuting witness had waited so long to come forward. 19B
Under Federal Rule 414, which deals with child molestation, the
courts must liberally admit evidence of prior sex crimes, regardless of
age, because the information may be especially probative. 199 In United
States v. Meachem,200 where the defendant was charged with abusing a
female relative, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit admitted
testimony from two other adult relatives that their stepfather fondled
them thirty years earlier. 20l The testimony was admitted to rebut the
defendant's testimony that he had never sexually touched his stepdaughters when they were under the age of fourteen. 202 The court
agreed with the prosecution that the evidence was probative because
both events occurred when the defendant was a mature man, the defendant had apparently not sought treatment for his proclivities, and
the patterns of abuse were sufficiently similar that the defendant was
not unfairly prejudiced. 203
Nonetheless, courts are free to decide if very old claims may be unfair to the defendant. In United States v. Larson,204 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit admitted testimony, under Federal Rule
of Evidence 414, from two adult men about the defendant's alleged
sexual abuse of them sixteen to twenty years earlier, but excluded testimony from another alleged victim whose abuse had occurred twenty
to twenty-one years earlier. 205 Without explaining exactly why, the
court said that the latter allegations were simply too remote in time to
be fair to the defendant. 206
Ultimately, the matter of remote claims will be one of discretion,
and the court may choose to exclude such a claim, if, for example, the
other incidents occurred when the defendant was a minor, or the act
charged was recent and the other crimes very remote. 207 Alternatively, if remote claims are admitted, the jury will still ultimately de-

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

dence that the defendant shot the victim twice in the side four or five years
earlier was admissible to show specific intent that the subsequent shooting
of the victim was not likely to be an accident).
Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 697 A.2d 432 (1997).
Id. at 409, 697 A.2d at 44l.
United States v. Meachem, 115 F.3d 1488, 1491-92 (lOth Cir. 1997).
115 F.3d 1488 (lOth Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1492-93.
United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 602.
Id.
See, e.g., Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 501, 597 A.2d 956,962 (1991) (refusing to admit remote evidence in trial for recent drug sale).
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cide how much weight it wants to accord possibly stale testimony of
old claims.208
4.

The Rules Will Not Unduly or Unfairly Dilute or Delay the
Proceedings

Critics also protest that the rules will create a trial within a trial, thus
causing undue delay and prejudice to the defendant. 209 Yet, again,
courts are accustomed to dealing with evidence of uncharged acts. 210
Pretrial hearings are commonly held at the request of either party to
try to obtain an advance ruling against admitting certain evidence. 211
Furthermore, Maryland's proposed rule specifically provides that
other act evidence must be presented in a closed hearing to protect
against the jury hearing evidence that the judge might find to be unfairly prejudicial. 212 The same kind of procedure is followed now in
Maryland when other crimes evidence is offered under Rule 5404(b).213
Furthermore, if the judge finds other crimes evidence to be highly
relevant and helpful, taking the time to hear it will be worthwhile.
Indeed, that ruling might lead to a plea bargain, and actually save the
court's time.
On the other hand, the trial judge may decide that the additional
testimony and witnesses may simply overburden the current proceedings. This was the case in United States v. Guardia,214 where the judge
excluded testimony from additional patients in a doctor's sexual misconduct trial. 215 The rationale was that the additional witnesses would
"transform [a] trial of two incidents into [a] trial of six incidents, each
requiring description by lay witnesses and explanation by expert witnesses," and thus slow down the trial. 216

5.

The Rules Will Not Let in a Disproportionate Share of False Allegations and Mere Rumors Because of Safeguards

Whether spoken or not, many critics fear that the new rules will fuel
false rape claims. One opponent of the new rule, testifying before the
Maryland House Judiciary Committee on February 19, 2004, worried
that the proposed bill would allow pre-teen girls, angered because
they had not been selected to dance in Swan Lake, to concoct a story
208. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902 (1983) (noting that juries
decide how much weight to give evidence).
209. See Karp, supra note 104, at 22.
2lO. See Karp, supra note 104, at 20-22.
211. See Karp, supra note lO4, at 21-22.
212. See McLain, supra note 129.
213. See McLain, supra note 129.
214. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326 (lOth Cir. 1998).
215. Id. at 1332.
216. Id.
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that their dance teacher had molested them, and secure a conviction
based on their joint testimony.217
Such a scenario, however, has no logical connection to the proposed rules. Police, prosecutorial, and judicial discretion, which are
unaltered by the new rules, are designed to minimize bogus claims
long before they ever get to trial. Such hurdles arguably make it hard
enough for one false claimant to successfully litigate her fabricated
story;218 it would be even more difficult for two or three false claimants to consistently maintain their fake "Swan Lake" claims through
the entire judicial process. While some false rape reports nonetheless
prevail,219 the proposed rules of evidence would not make such a result more likely.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Due to the secretive and highly damaging nature of sex crimes, and
the fact that these trials often come down to a swearing match between grossly unequal parties, Maryland should override its aversion
to evidence of prior sex offenses to prove a defendant's propensity to
commit future crimes, and adopt Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and
414, along with their procedural safeguards that ensure fairness to defendants. As Maryland Attorney GeneralJoseph Curran stated in voicing his support for House Bill 401, the new rule would remove a
"plainly unjust bar against the admission of relevant information in
sexual child abuse prosecutions."220 Curran underscores the fact that
"entrusting the admissibility determination to the trial court's discre-

217. Personal observation of the hearing on H.D. 401 before the House Judiciary Committee during the 418th session of the 2004 General Assembly.
(Notes on file with author.)
218. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1300 (1997) (suggesting that,
among the many women who eventually drop rape charges, some may do
so because of "a dawning realization that a false report of rape is a dangerous business"). No reliable data exists on how many women drop charges
because they were false to begin with, since many police departments classify as "unfounded" those rapes that are either falsely alleged, or those with
insufficient testimony, or whose victims decide to drop charges. See, e.g.,
Del Quentin Wilber, Police Figures on Rape in Error, BALT. SUN, Dec. 3, 2003,
at lB.
219. There is no consensus on the actual number of false rapes reported to the
police. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 218, at 1298 (citing the conventional, but not unanimous, wisdom that "the proportion of false reports [of
rape] is negligible, perhaps as low as 2%, a figure said to be comparable to
that for most other crimes.").
220. Letter from Attorney General Joseph Curran to Del. Joseph Vallario, Chair
of House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 23, 2004) (on file with author).
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tion ensures that only highly probative and reliable evidence is allowed and safeguards against any unfair prejudice."221
Joyce R Lombardi

221. Id.

